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‘The Noise, and the People’ 




 . . . this account of an utterance requires a reorientation of our postures 
of attention and our grammatical mode of analysis. Our appreciation of an 
other’s speech requires the subjunctive.1 
 
The supremely elite genre of Roman historiography, with its senatorial and imperialist 
narratives, might seem the least accommodating to any weaker voice, were it not that, 
in treating res gestae, the historian trains his focus on the res populi Romani. The 
people, however, often remain the voiceless object of historiographical discourse, 
spoken of just as in oratory they are spoken for. Sallust observed that ‘the influence 
of the plebs, diluted and dissipated across the multitude, was less potent’2—plebis vis 
soluta atque dispersa in multitudine minus poterat (Jug. 41.6)—a political inefficacy 
perhaps linked to the absence of a singular voice. Nevertheless, the noise of the 
multitude punctuates state business, and its preservation in the historical record is 
not merely for vivid effect. The Roman historians enfold the noise of the crowd into 
their narratives in such a way as to preserve its disruptive political effect. This is 
especially the case for the early books of Livy, which are particularly concerned with 
the emergence of the popular political voice, and with the question of how plebs and 
patres might effectively partake of the commonwealth. But rather than considering 
representative speeches by singular spokesmen, I want to maintain focus on the 
multitudinous, popular voice at the moment of its apparent political delegitimation—
the moment where it emerges as clamor or noise. Such focus presents an 
                                                 
1 Panagia (2009: 60). I would like to thank the editors, Stephen Harrison and Sebastian Matzner, as well 
as Hannah-Marie Chidwick, Alexander Dressler, Ahuvia Kahane, Duncan Kennedy and Miriam Leonard 
for talking through this paper with me, and Brad Potter for reading through the final draft. 
2 All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own. 
 
 
interpretative problem: what sort of account can one make of noise which allows its 
political status but does not assimilate it simply to discourse?  
 
I would like to begin such an account by bringing clamor closer to discourse in the way 
that it raises issues about representation and quotation in historiography. This is a 
familiar question for anyone who considers the speeches of individuals as rendered 
by the historians, and usually engages with Thucydides’ account of how he renders 
logoi in his narrative. (Thuc. 1.22.1) Readers now tend to recognize such logoi as part 
of the historian’s representational strategy, while acknowledging the mimetic power 
of the speech, which creates the ‘impression of hearing the precise words of an 
original speaker’.3 Thus readers respond to the speech—even reported speech—as if 
it were quotation. I propose to adopt the same approach to the noise of the crowd in 
historiography, which bears the same elusive relation to words spoken by living 
bodies. When the historian evokes both the content and sound-effect of collective 
clamor, it provides us with an opportunity to read this as representation, and as if 
quotation. Such reading, moreover, draws attention to the borderline status of clamor 
between speech and noise, utterance and event.4 
 
To approach this question, I turn to perspectives offered by Jacques Rancière and Julia 
Kristeva. Rancière’s concept of how the political is inaugurated in the division between 
speech and noise is a starting point, but Kristeva’s formulation of the semiotic enables 
a more detailed exploration of noise’s affect and valency. Kristeva provides a (much 
debated) model for how noise subtends the rationalizing narrative of the status quo. 
Meanwhile, Rancière’s presentation of ‘the account’ of speech offers a way of thinking 
about both political and narrative representation. It seems to me that both of these 
theories of how and where language intersects with the political open up a space for 
the expression and exploration of popular clamor. 
 
                                                 
3 Laird (1999: 137). 
4 On utterance as event, Laird (1999: 150-2). 
 
 
Dissonance is the quality which ties the aural effect of noise to its supposed lack of 
political purchase. An early example from Tacitus’ Histories illustrates this very well: 
 
Vniversa iam plebs Palatium implebat, mixtis servitiis et dissono clamore 
caedem Othonis et coniuratorum exitium poscentium ut si in circo aut 
theatro ludicrum aliquod postularent: neque illis iudicium aut veritas, 
quippe eodem die diversa pari certamine postulaturis, sed tradito more 
quemcumque principem adulandi licentia adclamationum et studiis 
inanibus. (Hist. 1.32.1-2) 
 
Now the whole plebeian body filled the Palatine, intermingled with servile 
elements, and with the dissonant clamour of those demanding the 
slaughter of Otho and death to conspirators, as if they were requesting 
some game or other at the circus or theatre: and in these shouts there was 
no judgement or sincerity, since in the one day they were going to request 
opposite things with equal fervour, but it was the tradition of those 
clamouring in support of whichever princeps, marked by licence of flattery 
and meaningless enthusiasms. 
 
The dissonus clamor reflects not only the mixture of plebeians and slaves in the crowd, 
but also the variety of their cries, some calling out CAED’MOTHONIS and others 
CONIURATOR’MEXITIUM—the elisions pointing up the confusion of these overlapping 
slogans.5 Tacitus continues to dismiss any political validity to the clamor by likening it 
in both sound and content to the demands which the same crowd would present at 
the races and the shows, locations which are similarly contested as political or non-
political sites. Finally, the lack of political judgement or consistency in the crowd is 
deduced from their change to a new chant later in the same day.6 The dissonance at 
this point in time is amplified by the diversa of a later time; but this increasingly 
confused sound is at once highly resonant—as the clamor of the moment joins in with 
a generalised practice of acclamatio—and yet lacking in substance or meaning, 
expressing only the studia inania of the imperial sordida plebs.7 
                                                 
5 For elision in prose, cf. Riggsby (1991). 
6 As Tacitus will narrate at 1.45.1-2: ‘they abused Galba, praised the judgement of the soldiers . . . kept 
demanding punishment for the consul designate’—increpare Galbam, laudare militum iudicium . . . 
Marium Celsum, consulem designatum... ad supplicium expostulabat. This later crowd is a mixture of 
senate and people. 
7 ‘The filthy plebs, accustomed to circus and theatre’—plebs sordida et circo et theatris sueta (Tac. Hist. 
1.4.3). Cf. Aldrete (1999: 102) on the shifting of imperial political topography towards places of 




In complex ways, then, the clamor of the plebs is here presented as pure noise, which, 
although it is denied political validity, retains political effect, and leaves its traces in 
the historical narrative. Tacitus draws on traditions of representing popular clamor 
here: a phenomenon at the borders of the political in every sense. Sometimes denied 
inclusion, it nevertheless serves to delineate the political, as I will go on to examine. 
Scholars such as Fergus Millar, Robert Morstein-Marx and Henrik Mouritsen have 
articulated the ways in which the plebs or the populus Romanus could express 
themselves in the political arena of the contio. 8  Morstein-Marx, in his insightful 
analysis of the voice of the people, identifies how the political nature of that voice was 
a matter of contestation, when he remarks that ‘On one interpretation . . . any contio 
will have represented nothing less than the Voice of the Roman People; on another, 
however, it produced nothing more significant than the noisy squawking of the most 
questionable elements of the urban mob.’9 Precisely this issue of noisy squawking and 
its non-significance is central to how Jacques Rancière conceptualises the delineation 
of the political, as he indicates in Disagreement: ‘Politics exists because the logos is 
never simply speech, because it is always indissolubly the account that is made of this 
speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech, capable 
of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission is merely perceived as a 
noise signalling pleasure or pain, consent or revolt.’10 For Rancière, then, it is not a 
question of identifying whether clamor has political force or not; the very account 
which polices the difference between speech and noise is in itself political. The noise 
that signals pleasure or pain introduces another element of these accounts which 
helps to police these differences: while speech or logos is of the rational mind, noise 
is of the sensual body. It is no surprise that popular noise in Roman historiography 
often emerges in response to food shortages, or threats to shelter posed by fire. 
 
The irruption of bodily needs into the political sphere receives its most sustained 
treatment in Livy’s account of the earliest years of the Republic, particularly in Book 
                                                 
8 Millar 1998; Morstein-Marx 2004; Mouritsen 2001. 
9 Morstein-Marx (2004: 128). On the limited voice of the people, North (1990), Connolly (2006). 
10 Rancière (1999: 22-23). 
 
 
2, where political representation—the institution of plebeian tribunes—arises out of 
popular concerns about loss of land and property, debt, and physical abuse suffered 
at the hands of creditors. As if in response to this politicizing of bodily needs, the 
senator Menenius Agrippa presents a justification of the senate’s primacy in the state 
by recounting the well-known parable of the primordial body in rebellion, and thereby 
he identifies precisely the political issue at stake. It is worth looking in some detail at 
the tradition of this episode, not only because of what it has to say about political 
speech and bodily noise, but also because Livy’s account of the parable—and of the 
plebeian secession—plays an important role in the formulation of Rancière’s 
philosophy. 
 
‘So it pleased the senate to send a speaker to the plebs: Menenius Agrippa, an 
eloquent man and, because he originated from that class, dear to the plebs (facundum 
virum et quod inde oriundus erat plebi carum). This man, sent to their camp, is said to 
have told them nothing but this story, in that primitive and rough kind of speech 
(prisco illo dicendi et horrido modo): Once upon a time the human body was not like 
now, with all the parts feeling the same together, but each individual part had its own 
counsel, its own speech (suum cuique consilium, suus sermo). And the other parts of 
the body were aggrieved that the belly’s demands were met by their responsibility, 
effort and tasks, while the belly remained inactive in the middle doing nothing but 
enjoying the pleasures they gave. So they conspired for the hands not to bring food to 
the mouth, for the mouth not to accept what was given, and the teeth not to chew. 
While they wanted in their anger to tame the belly by hunger, instead the very limbs 
and the whole body almost wasted away. Then it became apparent that the task of 
the belly was not useless, that it fed as much as it was fed, returning to all parts of the 
body in equal measure that element by which we live and flourish, spreading through 
the veins enriched by the intake of food—the blood. By comparing the internal 
sedition of the body as similar to the anger of the plebs against the senate, he changed 
the minds of people (Comparando hinc quam intestina corporis seditio similis esset 




The image of the body politic here is one which organises its members in relations of 
production—a point made more explicitly in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (6.86.4). The 
belly appears only to consume, but the punchline of Livy’s version holds back until the 
final word, sanguis, the recognition that it really produces the lifeblood of the body.11 
The choice of belly rather than head as ruling body part appears to reverse the 
hierarchy of rationality over sensuality,12 but it is well-chosen as a rebuttal to the 
plebeian charge that the senate enjoys all the gains and suffers none of the pains of 
civic duty. Instead, it compels the plebeians to recognise what the senate does for 
them, and so in turn to resume their bodily toils in service of the state.  
 
Rancière’s analyses of this passage take a different tack by focusing, not on the 
content of the parable, but on the circumstance of Menenius’ address to the plebs. 
He argues that the very act of address already concedes a political place for the plebs 
in a way that cuts across the ostensible message of the parable: ‘Behind that fable’s 
moral, which illustrated the inequality of functions in the social body, lay quite a 
different moral, one inherent in the very act of composing a fable. This act of 
composition was based on the assumption that it was necessary to speak and that this 
speaking would be heard; the assumption of a pre-existing equality between a wish to 
speak and a wish to hear . . . The moral of the very act of fabulation was thus the 
equality of intelligences.’ 13  The political philosopher Martin Breaugh, who traces 
Rancière’s reception of Livy’s story through a specifically plebeian tradition, 
illuminates how this new politicizing could also proceed by proclaiming the dominance 
of reason over body: ‘Agrippa was thus the one responsible for having created a space 
for egalitarian exchange, because he believed the plebs capable of understanding the 
meaning of his story and of transcending the imperatives of the biological order.’14 
Thus, instead of following the parable and taking the biological order as symbolic of 
the social order, Rancière and Breaugh concentrate on the political connotations of 
                                                 
11 Ogilvie 1965 ad loc. 
12 Contrast the symbolism of the human head at the end of Livy Book 1. 
13 Rancière (1995: 82); cf. id. (1998: 25).  
14 Breaugh (2013: 94) (my emphases). 
 
 
the speech act itself, which is organized around the distinction between what is and is 
not recognized as speech. 
 
Indeed, the parable also resonates with the possibility and impossibility of speech, 
since it proceeds, in the way of parables, by assigning the power of expression (sermo 
Livy 2.32.9, phōnē DH 6.86.2) to all human body parts or members.15 In one sense this 
capacity for speech is dramatically necessary for the members to quarrel and be 
reconciled. Indeed, in both Dionysius’ and Plutarch’s versions the members do no 
more than talk about their rebellion, and Dionysius’ Menenius drives home the 
parallel by exhorting the plebs to leave off their hostile words against the senate: 
epiphthonous phōnas (3.86.5). 16  In another sense the impossible and necessary 
speech of the members already transcends the imperatives of the biological order. By 
locating the senate in the belly the parable denaturalizes the association of patrician 
dominance with the faculties of reason and speech; and this is more evident in 
Dionysius, where the members begin their rebellion by declaring their special 
contribution to the bodily whole. The mouth states ‘that it speaks’ (to de stoma, hoti 
phtheggetai DH 6.86.2), while the belly alone is silent in the face of its accusers. In 
Plutarch, the belly does speak back, and also laughs in mockery. Livy’s account places 
the rebellion in the realm of action,17 and this throws into sharper relief the comment 
that each bodily member possesses suum consilium, suus sermo: the power of speech 
is described but not instantiated. 
 
Within the world of the parable, then, we might also postulate a new egalitarianism, 
in that speech seems to be equally impossible and necessary for each body part. Again, 
a resonance is set up with Menenius’ address to the plebs, which emanates ostensibly 
from the senate, for whom he serves as mouthpiece, while Menenius himself emerges 
                                                 
15 Dionysius further allows the members the capacity to hypothesize, while Plutarch casts the bodily 
exchange in the modes of accusation and mockery (Coriolanus 6.3). 
16 Dio’s version of the parable carries out the process from speech to action by having the members 
vote on their rebellion against the belly (4.17.11). 




from the belly of the plebs: a facundus vir and quod inde oriundus erat plebi carus.18 
The homophony of orator and oriundus points up that Menenius’ speech and 
Menenius’ body traverse the gulf between patrician and plebeian. Rancière refers to 
him as a ‘class traitor’19—but which class does he betray?  
 
The paradox of Menenius’ speech is extended as on this occasion he speaks prisco illo 
dicendi et horrido modo, whether by virtue of his plebeian origin, or of the primitive 
nature of speech at that time.20 Or perhaps he suspends his senatorial eloquence in 
order to speak in a way which appeals to the plebs, evoking the concordia his parable 
seeks to effect, by adopting the sermo appropriate to the body parts he addresses.21 
In either case, Menenius performs a sort of ventriloquism, as his speech emerges from 
a place he never quite occupies, creating a space where there was none before. 
Menenius’ intervention counts as disruptive in Rancière’s terms, because of his 
‘production . . . of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable 
within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the 
reconfiguration of the field of experience.’22 
 
Rancière’s analysis draws our attention away from the content or circumstance of 
popular clamor, towards its qualities as noise before it is made to make sense. Like 
Rancière, Davide Panagia concentrates on the disruptive and interruptive effects of 
noise within discourses of and about the political. He traces, through Bakhtin’s study 
of ‘speech genres’, a way of rethinking utterance in terms of duration of noise rather 
than semantic units, so that interruption is figured as ‘a condition of responsiveness’23 
                                                 
18 Livy is alone in claiming plebeian origin for Menenius. Dionysius introduces him as a mature and 
moderate senator (6.49.2), and has his supporters regard him as andrōn aristokratikōn ton 
epiphanestaton (6.57.1). 
19 Rancière (1998: 24). 
20 Ogilvie (1965: 313) implies both: ‘Menenius is a plebeian and is supposed to speak prisco illo et 
horrido modo. To represent such archaic uncouthness directly would offend . . .’ Smith (2010: 267-8) 
on this speech as part of the historiographical tradition. 
21 On Menenius as embodiment of concordia, Connolly (2007: 45). Cf. Momigliano (1942). 
22  Rancière (1998: 35). I would add that this disruption is registered and recorded by the 
historiographical narratives continued incorporation, accommodation, and marking of the parable as 
parable. 




rather than as an intervention only legitimated after the event and in a reconfigured 
field of experience. This is a point I want to return to later, though here it reflects upon 
Dionysius’ extensive account of the embassy to the plebs, where each speech is 
framed and punctuated by boē and throus. 24  But, once they have established a 
different way of thinking about noise, Rancière and Panagia each turn to explore new 
spatial formations of the political. This represents a recurrent problem in thinking 
about noise in ways which resist both the hermeneutic imperative and the simple 
deictic gesture; that is, how does one trace the political work done by noise without 
either translating it into logos or simply attesting to it as phonē? Through reading Livy, 
later, we will see how the political effect of noise is read through a transformation of 
space which enables new forms of representation. But, before exploring how Livy 
stages this effect, I want to turn to Kristeva’s concept of the semiotic, and its 
consonance with lalangue and glossolalia, as a way back to the noise of popular 
clamor, and the possibility for tracing this through historiography. 
 
Particularly in Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva provides an account of a pre-
Oedipal relation to what will become language, grounding it in the body before 
subjectivity, and positing its later violent repression as an effect of the dominant 
symbolic order. This is the order of the semiotic, located in the paradoxical maternal 
space of the chora. As she states ‘the chora precedes and underlies figuration . . . and 
is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm.’25 In such rhythms, Kristeva suggests, the 
semiotic articulates connections not only between the zones of the fragmented body 
before subjectivity (the sphincters), but between the pre-subject and what will later 
be designated external objects (such as parental figures). ‘Articulation’ is glossed by 
Kristeva as ‘in the largest sense of the word’;26 I believe this is to emphasize the bodily 
experience of vocal articulation.27  
                                                 
24 Compare the Alexandrians’ punctuation of Germanicus’ speech in P.Oxy 2435 recto. 
25 Kristeva (1984: 26) 
26 Kristeva (1984: 28). 
27 At the same time, bodily experience is not restricted to the body as we understand it in a post-
infantile sense. We find an echo of this undifferentiated experience in the ancient texts which declare 
a continuum between popular noise and the natural world, often in the service of denying it political 
validity. The locus classicus is Plato Rep. 492b-c, but we might also consider the similes at Iliad 2.142-




The plot of Kristeva’s account is structured on the familiar psychoanalytic model of 
infantile development; indeed, she goes on to narrate the irruption of the symbolic 
order with explicit reference to Freud’s myth of the primal horde. But her sense of 
what happens to the semiotic in language is my main interest here. While Kristeva 
concentrates on high art, and particularly on modernist poetry, as the site into which 
the semiotic will violently irrupt, some of her most distinctive formulations also 
provide a way to conceive of popular clamor as well. First, she draws attention to the 
semantic excess of poetry, the way in which it offers a pleasurable surplus of meaning: 
this challenges the symbolic order’s claim to sufficiency, drawing attention to the 
semiotic dimension with its multiple articulations. The noise of the people is also given 
the quality of excess, but in a different way; it appears as excess because it is perceived 
to have a deficit of meaning often at the same time as it affords a surplus of pleasure: 
we note the reference to studia inania in the Tacitus passage with which I began. From 
the perspective which valorizes the economics of language exchange, this appears as 
‘the nonproductive expenditure of noise’28 just as poetry can seem to be a ‘harmless 
bonus’29 to a socially useful discourse. Secondly, Kristeva draws attention to the bodily 
experience of rhythm and, later, of phonic repetition as the baseline of the semiotic 
chora, and as phenomena which are discernible not only in poetry but in a wide variety 
of speech acts both individual and collective. 
 
Kristeva’s initial focus on rhythm and sound as the vehicle for instinctual drives, in the 
opening to the second (untranslated) half of La révolution du langage poétique, is 
given further resonance by the echo of pulsation in the French term for ‘instinct’ or 
‘drive’—pulsion.30 Rhythm and intonation as non-semantic components provide an 
apparatus for the instinctual drives. Kristeva sees this apparatus as emerging from 
music, into the melodically accented languages of antiquity, only to be transposed into 
                                                 
28 Panagia (2009: 54). 
29 Kristeva (1984: 16). 
30 This is also the term insisted upon by Laplanche and Pontalis, as observed by their translator (1973, 




vernacular speech as syllabic rhythm marked by alliteration and homophony. It is 
telling that she sees this transposition also as a return to the modes of popular oral 
poetry.31 The effect that Kristeva posits for this rhythmic dimension is a network of 
sound-sense which exceeds the semantic register of the utterance and approaches 
the semiotic chora: ‘à travers les bases pulsionnelles de la phonation, les traits 
distinctifs du système phonémique . . . articulent un réseau de sens constitué de 
différentielles phoniques et signifiantes.’ 32  (‘Across the instinctual ground of 
phonation [the production of phōnē], the distinctive characteristics of the sound-
sense system [sc. displacements, condensations, transpositions and repetitions] 
articulate a network of sense constituted by the differentials between phonic and 
signifying elements.’) The mode of reading which Kristeva enjoins, therefore, does not 
either tune out the semiotic element, or forsake the symbolic functioning of language. 
It does not require us to translate phonē into logos, or to abandon interpretation for 
the deictic gesture. The focus on ‘signifying differentials’ instead draws our attention 
to the interplay between the semiotic and symbolic dimensions. 
 
A reminder of the sensory appeal of rhythm and repetition, for both speakers and 
listeners,33 may well alert us to the effects of particular recurring syllables in texts, 
which could be read as attempts to capture the murmur populi (and it is no 
coincidence that both these words are essentially syllabic repetitions). We can 
imagine a crowd seizing upon particular slogans which exploit syllabic repetition—one 
thinks of Suetonius’ crowd chanting ‘into the Tiber with Tiberius’: Tiberium in Tiberim 
(Suet. Tib. 75.1), or of Horace’s ‘crowded people spurring the slackers on to war, TO 
WAR’: populus frequens/ ad arma cessantis, ad arma/ concitet (Horace Od. 1.35.14-
16).34 Equally, repetition emerges as an effect of multiple speakers, who repeat and 
                                                 
31 ‘Transposition’ is, of course, Kristeva’s preferred term to describe the passage from one sign system 
to another, after what she perceived as the ideological hijacking and banalization of her initial coinage, 
‘intertextuality’. Kristeva (1984: 59-60).  
32 Kristeva (1974: 213; her emphases). 
33 Cf. Butler (2015: 59-68). 
34 Some editors propose fremens for frequens in Horace’s text. On arma and ad arma as recurrent 
popular expressions, cf. Nisbet & Hubbard on Hor. Od. 1.35.15; Oakley on Livy 6.28.3; Ogilvie (1965) on 




thereby transmit words across the crowd—a practice adopted in Occupy Wall Street 
as “The People’s Mic”.35 Finally, we can extend our engagement with crowd noise as 
it is ‘quoted’ in the historians by speculating on the echo effect of any large group 
attempting to articulate the same words.36 That is to say, the plebs may very well fill 
the Palatine with their cries of caed’mothonis, but even the most well-organized 
crowd will, in an open space, drift apart from each other, creating what we might now 
call a sort of sonic Mexican wave: caed-caede-caed’mo-caed’mthonis-is-nis-onis. The 
overlapping syllables form new relations, releasing wordlike combinations (here I 
detect a decae and a sonis, for instance); collectively, the crowd produces a sort of 
glossolalia, speech that is like a language. As Michel de Certeau observes, ‘What utopia 
is to social space, glossolalia is to oral communication; it encloses in a linguistic 
simulacrum all that is not language and comes from the speaking voice.’37 Here the 
rhythm of clamor not only reproduces the bodily articulation of the chora, it also 
appears as an effect of the political space: the echoing forum itself helps to create the 
linguistic simulacrum.38 
 
To consider this phenomenon more extensively, let us return to the originary scene of 
plebeian politics, the second book of Livy, and the episode of the debt slaves (nexi) in 
chapters 23-24. Discussed at length by social theorists from Machiavelli to David 
Graeber, this episode provides a detailed elaboration of how, in Rancière’s terms, a 
new space is designed as political. And this proceeds through outbursts of vocal and 
kinetic movement/energy of symbolic and semiotic power. It begins with the confused 
sound of the nexi—fremebant (23.2)—seething at the inequity of their civic duty to 
fight for Rome, when they are the prey of fellow-citizens in the economic sphere. The 
collective utterance is then exemplified by a solitary speaker, a veteran; here a new 
                                                 
35 Dean (2016: 3). For more formal strategies in the Roman circus, Nelis-Clément (2008: 452). 
36 Aldrete, on the other hand, observes that syllabic repetition performs a function in enabling the 
crowd to pick up new slogans and to maintain unison in their chanting. His example from Dio of an 
extraordinary degree of unison, however, is clearly marked as extraordinary by the historian (Dio 
76.4.3, 5). Aldrete (1999: 125-6). 
37 De Certeau (1996: 31). 
38 The echo effect will be amplified by the structures and surfaces of the imperial city. Augustus’ well-
known claim to have found Rome a city of brick and left it in marble (a more acoustically lively 
substance) would have transformed the civic soundscape. Cf. the acoustic analysis of the circus space 
by Nelis-Clément (2008). 
 
 
space is opened up ‘much as though it were an assembly’—prope in contionis modum 
(23.5). This is the effect of the veteran’s initial physical movements: ‘he rushed into 
the forum’ and ‘displayed his scars’—in forum proiecit (23.3) and cicatrices ostentabat 
(23.4)—as well as of the vocal movement of the vulgus or turba ‘asking the cause of 
his dress, of his injuries’—sciscitantibus unde ille habitus, unde deformitas (23.5). The 
veteran’s speech concludes with another physical movement: ‘he displayed his 
back’—ostentare tergum (23.7), which sets off the clamor of the crowd and 
transforms the political space yet again: ‘a mighty uproar arose. The disturbance was 
no longer confined to the Forum, but spread in all directions through the entire City’—
clamor ingens oritur. Non iam foro se tumultus continet sed passim totam urbem 
pervadit (23.7). The sound gathers both nexi and allies, and brings them back to the 
central space: ‘with shouting there is a rush into the forum’—cum clamore in forum 
curritur, or ‘shouting INTO THE FORUM, they rushed there’ (23.8).39 Both throughout 
the city and back in the forum, the nexi imitate the veteran in gesture and sound: ‘The 
debt slaves broke out into the streets from every side, and implored the Quirites to 
protect them’; ‘they displayed their chains and other signs of abuse, saying this was 
their reward . . . ’—nexi . . . se undique in publicum proripiunt, implorant Quiritium 
fidem (23.8);  multitudo. . . ostentare vincula sua deformitatemque aliam. Haec se 
meritos dicere . . . (23.10-11). News of a Volscian attack does not unite the Romans 
against a common enemy; instead the plebs declare their absolute refusal to obey the 
levy. In response, the consul Servilius, whose temperament, we are told, inclined 
towards the people—magis populare erat (24.3)—addresses the plebs in a contio, and 
concludes with an edict which formally declares as unjust and unlawful the inequities 
which were the substance of the opening complaint: edixit ne quis . . . (24.6). From the 
grumble of fremebant to the declarative edixit we see how articulation moves from 
delegitimized noise to political logos, through the transformation of space.40 
 
                                                 
39 The association of clamor with currere is very common in historical narratives of group excitement: 
cf. the ‘rhythmic crowd’, Canetti (1962: 31-34). 
40  Fantham’s passing comment on this—‘a scene surely worthy of Monty Python’ (2005: 214)—
internalizes the elite dismissal of plebeian speech as mere noise/nonsense. In a more serious vein, 




The status of the vocal as one form of bodily articulation is crucial here, as evinced by 
the display of cicatrices, vestigia and deformitas,41 which spreads through the crowd, 
keeping pace with the crowd’s own movement through space, and the movement of 
clamor. The vocal dimension does not merely lend sound to these gestures: vocal 
articulation appears on a continuum with other movements of the body. Here I want 
to focus on the sound-effect of the collective utterances, beginning with the object of 
fremebant.  
 
se foris pro libertatet imperio dimicantes struggling abroad for liberty and empire 
domi a civibus captos et oppressos esse. at home captured and oppressed by 
citizens 
tutior’min bello qu’min pace   safer in war than in peace 
et inter hostis qu’minter civis    among enemies than among citizens 
libertatem plebis esse (23.2)   is plebeian freedom 
 
Of all the examples here, this is the one with the longest and most elaborated 
phrases—4 phrases for 29 words—while the interdependence of the phrases makes 
it difficult to isolate a conjectural slogan. The semantic emphasis on libertas, at the 
start and the end of the speech, receives its counterpoint in the syllabic repetitions 
recombining l, b/p and r: LIBERtatet imPERIo . . . BELLo . . . LIBERtatem PLEBIs.  
 
The repetitions of the final collective utterance are far easier to spot, while the 
phrases are much shorter, and metrically more varied. While it seems less effective as 
a speech viewed in traditional terms,42 it evokes more strongly the sense of discrete 
phrases taken up by a mob. 
 
ultores superbiae patr’madesse [dicere] deos gods avenge patrician arrogance 
[alius alium confirmare] ne nomina darent  do not give names 
c’monibus potius quam solos perituros  to die with all rather than alone 
patres militarent     let patricians go to war 
patres arma caperent     let patricians take arms 
ut penes eosdem pericula belli to them accrue the dangers of 
war 
penes quos praemiassent (24.2)   to whom accrue the rewards 
                                                 
41 Cf. Leigh 1995, reading these as a mode of expression which merits political status. 




There are more possibilities for reconstructing slogans here: the murmur of ne nomina 
darent replicates the way in which this injunction passes from one speaker to another, 
in an early version of the People’s Mic. Also, the rhyming doublet patres militarent | 
patres arma caperent has sensory appeal in itself,43 as well as contributing to the 
dominant phonic rhythm spread across the dense layer of syllables formed by p, b, t, 
r/l: suPERBIae PATRum . . . POTIus . . . PERITURos PATREs miliTARENT PATREs arma 
caPERENT . . . PENEs eosdem PERIcula BElli PENEs quos PRAEMIassent. 
 
As Kristeva indicates, the network of sense emerges from the differential between 
phonic and semantic effects of the text. Both of these collective utterances have at 
their semantic base a negotiation of civic rights around the crisis point of war, 
responsibility for war, and the gains and losses of war.44 In the first utterance, the 
question is the relation between libertas and bellum; in the second, by way of 
response, bellum is figured as the responsibility and punishment of the patres.45 
Conversely, the phonic effect of bellum is more fully integrated into the rhythm of 
libertas-plebs than that of patres-peri-pere-praemi etc.  
 
For Kristeva, as for de Certeau, glossolalia and lalangue operate as ‘borderline 
discourses’,46 spoken by patients in analysis, avant-garde poets, or those possessed by 
the Holy Spirit. While these language effects have consequences for language as a 
whole in its psychological, social and political aspects, the primary interest for Kristeva 
in particular is to ground the political subject in the desiring body: ‘La contrainte 
majeure de ce nouveau dispositif sémiotique—de cette nouvelle rythmique—devient 
                                                 
43 This corresponds to what Aldrete (1999: 139) categorises as the ‘equation-type’ acclamation. 
44  Sallust outlines the same fundamental inequality in narrative mode: ‘To the oligarchs accrued 
treasury, provinces, magistracies, glories, triumphs; the people were hard pressed by military service 
and poverty.’—penes eosdem [paucos] aerarium provinicae magistratus gloriae triumphique erant; 
populus militia atque inopia urgebatur. (Jug. 41.7) The elisions in the last four words articulate the 
connection between civic duty and unequal wealth in plebeian experience. 
45 Cf. Leigh (1995: 205) on this trope in the speech of Licinius Macer (Sall. Hist. 3.48.17f.). 




l’expérience unique du sujet dans le procès signifiant, et sa base pulsionelle.’47 (‘The 
main constraint of this new semiotic system—this new rhythm—becomes the unique 
experience of the subject in the signifying process, and its instinctual basis.’) Hence, 
her insistence on the psychoanalytic dimension of the political maintains her focus on 
personal subjectivity. 48  Since her formulation of the semiotic situates it before 
subjectivity, however, her account of how the semiotic irrupts within the symbolic—
creating what she calls the ‘subject in process/on trial’49—does not depend absolutely 
on the idea of the individual, and retains the potential to be considered with regard 
to the collective. 
 
Unlike the texts studied by Kristeva, the voice of the crowd in historiography is elusive. 
In the reading of Livy above I have proceeded as if the words on the page were exact 
records of the words of the crowd, quotations rather than representations. I want to 
suggest, however, that, whether the words have survived or not, their particular sonic 
effect, and its psychological and political force, can be conjectured.50 This is the issue 
raised by Panagia in the quotation with which this chapter began: turning to the 
subjunctive, we could argue that historiography attempts to capture the noise of the 
crowd through echoes or responses to the sonic effects of multiple voices. The 
repeated syllables I’ve highlighted, heightened by alliteration, homoioteleuton, and 
extensive elision, suspend the clamor of the people between quotation and 
representation. 
 
Such effects are not, of course, exclusive to plebeian clamor: one only has to read 
ahead to Livy 2.28-29 to see these effects in both contio and senate. In elite speech, 
too, clamor is associated with a departure from rationality all the more deplorable in 
those whose education equips them for senatorial deliberation. Both Tacitus and 
                                                 
47 Kristeva (1974: 218). Noland (2005: 121-2) and Smith (1996: 102-5) from different perspectives 
express disappointment in Kristeva’s emphasis, and in the conclusions of her semiotic reading of 
Mallarmé. 
48 On Kristeva’s Maoist engagement here, cf. Brandt (2005: 29-32); Sjöholm (2005: 13-16). 
49 Kristeva (1984: 102). 
50 Analogous to this is the issue raised by Kristeva (1983: 40) about intonation as ‘an archaic component 




Pliny, for instance, speak of the dissonant sounds produced when senators en masse 
give way to unreasoning pity (Tac. Ann. 14.45; Pliny Ep. 2.11.6-7). But we can also see 
the sonic effects of clamor consciously adopted as rhetorical artifice for the purpose 
of persuasion. Here I have in mind Robert Morstein-Marx’s perceptive analysis of 
Cicero’s demagoguery in his Fourth Philippic, 51  as well as the highly provocative 
remarks of Joy Connolly on a fragment of Cato the Elder: 
 
The speech is evidence that Cato’s message lies not only in his argument 
but also in the way it draws attention to the quality of the words as they 
roll off his tongue: the grain of their timbre, their intimate connection to 
Cato’s physical being. Its sensual assonance and granulated crackles exert 
the power of the body beyond the limits of the body to demand assent . . 
. the result is intensified, transsomatized message—the essence of the 
“hyperclarity” of the traditional expression of authority.52 
 
Connolly suggests that sound as the vehicle of authority extends the boundaries of the 
body. As she argues here and elsewhere, the elite orator’s appeal to the populus 
reconstitutes the parameters of the political space so as to compel assent to the 
apparatus of political representation: the senate, the lawcourts, the orator himself. At 
the same time, however, the ‘transsomatized message’ Connolly identifies can be 
understood as a reminiscence of experience before the break of the symbolic, where 
no distinction is felt between what will later become one’s own body parts and the 
bodies of others. As we have seen Kristeva’s account of that experience in the semiotic 
chora is mediated through vocal and kinetic movement, where again no distinction is 
felt between the movement of the voice and that of any other body part. Cato’s voice 
works upon the crowd as a reminiscence of such experience, in a space where the 
crowd qua crowd is already generating similar sensory reminiscences through the 
partial surrender of individual mentality to that of the group. We are reminded that 
orators speak of their success in ‘moving the audience’. 
 
This has consequences for the construction and maintenance of singular, elite 
authority over the multiple, heterogeneous crowd, particularly in relation to 
                                                 
51 Morstein-Marx (2004: 139-43). 
52 Connolly (2007: 51). 
 
 
knowledge. The sounds which recall the semiotic chora require no expertise in their 
production, yet their emergence in historiography and rhetoric attests to the 
individual author’s knowledge and skill in mimesis, analysis and persuasion. We seem 
to capitulate once more to the distinction between speech and noise, and to accord 
greater authority to the former, unless we posit clamor as the expression, not of 
shared irrationality, but of an equality of intelligence—what was presumed by 
Menenius Agrippa when he spoke to the plebs.  
 
To consider this further, I want to turn to Cicero’s remarks which are very frequently 
cited in support of the idea that rhythm is a phenomenon universally understood by 
humans, regardless of learning. 53  What is particularly interesting about Cicero’s 
overlapping comments in Orator (168, 173) and De Oratore (3.195, 196, 198) is how 
clamor is seen to attest to the movements of listening and understanding in ways 
suggested by Panagia when he formulates ‘interruption [as] a condition of 
responsiveness’. In designating these as movements rather than actions, I want to 
suggest that they too partake of the semiotic. Yet in these scenes, the vocal-kinetic 
energies of the crowd—exclaiming and listening in a synaesthetic continuum54—are 
used as a benchmark for the orator to measure his performance in that most technical 
branch of his skill. The semiotic thus feeds back to the symbolic, and underwrites its 
authority. 
 
The opposition Cicero plays with here is between ars/ratio and natura, but he 
emphasizes throughout that nature has bestowed an extraordinary capacity for the 
unlearned to exercise judgement on the art of rhythmic speech: ‘For everyone can 
discern by some sensibility, without any skill or reasoning, what is correct or incorrect 
in the practice of skill and reasoning’—Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte 
aut ratione quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava diiudicant (de Orat. 3.195). 
This judgement is firmly grounded in the body: throughout both expositions Cicero 
emphasizes the sensory aspect of both the orator’s sentences and the audience’s 
                                                 
53 Wilkinson (1970: 154-5); Connolly (2007: 225-7); Valiavitcharska (2013: 1-2); Arena (2013: 200). 




natural apprehension of rhythm. Here the idea that somebody may not feel rhythm 
leads him to imagine a human without human attributes, but particularly without 
human ears: ‘those who cannot perceive, I wonder what ears they have, or what they 
have that is like a human’—qui non sentiunt, quas auris habeant aut quid in his hominis 
simile sit nescio (Or. 168). The ears become the central body part for his discourse: 
‘nature has grounded the capacity to judge speech in our ears’—vocum iudicium ipsa 
natura in auribus nostris conlocavit (Or. 173). The continuity between the movements 
of listening, seeing and calling out, delineated by Cicero’s continual slippage between 
the visual and the aural, evokes the pre-subjective chora. Cicero is able to see the 
vocal response of the audience—exclamare vidi—just as he imagines their ears on the 
lookout for rhythmic clausulae—exspectant aures (Or. 168). Human understanding of 
sound and language is strongest, Crassus claims in de Oratore, ‘because it is ingrained 
in our common senses’—quod ea sunt in communibus infixa sensibus (de Orat. 3.195). 
And this phrase communibus sensibus evokes the idea of senses common to humanity, 
as well as senses shared in the experience of crowd-as-body:55 the senses which work 
together in the visible and responsive moment of clamor.  
 
Crucially, the audience response here operates either as a corrective to faulty rhythm, 
or an affirmation of its success: the assemblies shout out, when phrases are well-
turned (Or. 168); the theatre shouts if a verse is too short or too long (Or. 173) or if a 
syllable is given the wrong quantity (de Orat. 3.196). Clamor thus arrives at the status 
of ‘the account’, policing the distinction between proper and improper speech, while 
it resists becoming logos.  
 
We know from political narratives that clamor populi is a borderline discourse; 
sometimes no more than mere noise, at other times accorded the status of a message, 
bearing the Will of the Roman People.56 It is also, as I hope to have shown, a borderline 
discourse in its linguistic and sonic effects, underlying the discourses of rhetoric, and 
                                                 
55 Mankin (2011: 286) likens communibus sensibus to the communi mente of de Orat. 3.115, which he 
glosses as an ‘almost Freudian expression’ (204); cf. Connolly (2007: 226) on a ‘collective political 
awareness’. 
56 Morstein-Marx (2004: 119-28). 
 
 
providing their counterpoint. In the narratives of historiography, I have suggested, 
historians artfully or unconsciously capture effects which are analogous to the effects 
of crowd noise. Conversely, the reader can, in speculative mode, dwell on the 
individual syllables of an imagined crowd slogan, drawing them out in a series of 
repetitions within which an echo of clamor can be felt. 
 
But the task is not merely to replicate clamor, which would maintain the illusion that 
it is possible to return to an archaic state before the irruption of the symbolic.57 
Rather, the ways in which clamor makes us consider language and discourse can 
provide other ways of hearing the dominant voice of historiography, the explanatory 
narrative which combines the modes of mimesis and metadiscourse.58  The latter 
purports to be, in Rancière’s words with which we began, ‘the account by which a 
sonorous emission is understood as speech’, yet, as we have just seen, the sound of 
the audience has the potential to take on this discursive role, and this enables us to 
think of noise as not merely disruptive of logos. The semiotic undertow of the very 
language in which the account is formulated both compromises and reinforces its 
authority; even as it partitions speech and noise, its own noise constitutes its 
persuasiveness. The opening sentence of Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae provides an 
appropriate articulation of this dynamic. 
 
Omnes homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus summa ope 
niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora quae natura prona 
atque ventri oboedientia finxit. (Cat. 1.1) 
 
All humans who desire to stand out from the animal world ought to strive 
to the best of their ability, not to pass through their lives in silence, like 
the beasts which nature has made on all fours, obedient to the belly. 
 
Sallust begins his analysis from first principles with the distinction between humans 
and beasts, conceived as an opposition not between speech and noise, but between 
sound and silence. Much later, sound will receive its content, and be sublimated into 
                                                 
57 On the necessary reciprocity of glossolalia and interpretation, cf. de Certeau (1996: 36-7). 
58 Cf. Kahane (2007). 
 
 
the written text. (Cat. 3.1) The silent beast is downward looking and navel-gazing by 
nature, while the human is or ought to be striving upwards—praestare . . . summa 
ope. Yet already in this opening sentence Sallust is both thinking and feeling through 
his concepts, as is evident also from the abundant alliterations of the preface. The 
beasts may go through their whole lives in silence, but the long o of silentio evokes 
their lowing, which in Sallust’s view does not even merit recognition as noise. And that 
repressed sound is most evident in the onomatopoeic opening words omnes homines, 
the mugitus of the human collective. At the very moment where Sallust inaugurates 
his historical narrative as an analytical discourse of universal relevance—logos writ 
large—the semiotic pulsation of his words draws its power from the ever-present, 
underlying murmur of the clamor populi. 
